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APRIL 15 SYNDROME 
JOEL SLEMROD, CHARLES CHRISTIAN, REBECCA LONDON, and JONATHAN A. PARKER* 
In tax year 1988, delayingfiling income tax returns cost the 73.2 million tax- 
payers claiming refunds nearly one billion dollars of interest. “Impatient” tax 
filers, who mail in their tax payments before the filing deadline, passed up $46 
million in interest. 
We develop a model of tax filing based on stochastic opportunity cost, and then 
investigate whetherjiling times are consistent with that model. We find some evi- 
dence for  this because, ceteris paribus, higher refunds are associated with earlier 
filing and complex returns are associated with later filing, as are higher incomes 
(as a proxy for higher costs of time). (JEL H24) 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
The popular characterization of completing 
and mailing individual tax forms is that peo- 
ple wait until the last minute to fill out their 
returns, and then rush to mail them at their 
nearest post office, which has extended its 
hours until midnight. This phenomenon, 
which we call “April 15 syndrome,” has large 
private costs. We estimate that for tax year 
1988 the 73.2 million taxpayers claiming re- 
funds gave up nearly one billion dollars in 
interest, or an average of about $13.50 per 
return, due to filing the forms later than the 
earliest possible time. * More incomprehensi- 
ble from an economic standpoint, but of less 
quantitative significance, are the impatient tax 
filers-10.5 million taxpayers who owed the 
InternaI Revenue Service (IRS) money and 
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1. The precise figure is $986 million, assuming a 7% an- 
nual nominal interest rate. In making this calculation, 
we use January 31 as the earliest possible filing date 
and ignore all returns filed before this filing date. 
passed up $46 million in interest by mailing 
in their taxes before the filing deadline. 
In addition to these direct costs, tax returns 
done in haste at the last minute may be more 
prone to error; to the extent they are not 
caught by the IRS, this adds to the capricious- 
ness of the tax burden. Correcting the errors 
due to rushed completing of forms also adds 
to the administrative costs of the IRS. Many 
cities and towns keep their post offices open 
late for no reason other than to accommodate 
the severe procrastinator. Finally, return pro- 
cessing is slowed by the avalanche of returns 
filed in mid-April. 
We present some exploratory analyses of 
April 15 syndrome using 1988 tax return data. 
After describing in section I1 the legal frame- 
work for tax filing, in section 111 we discuss 
the data and present the basic facts with which 
any model of filing behavior has to contend. 
There is a wide distribution of filing times, 
and a substantial fraction of households 
which, despite being owed refunds, file late, 
or which, despite owing taxes, file early. 
In section IV, we consider some basic mod- 
els of the decision as to when to file one’s 
taxes. We note that the simplest model fails 
to rationalize the most obvious characteristic 
of the data-the substantial heterogeneity of 
filing times. In the baseline rational model in- 
dividuals simply maximize their income less 
effort, which involves either complete pro- 
crastination or prompt filing. Adding imper- 
fect information does not seem to eliminate 
the result. We are led to a model in which 
individuals have a stochastic opportunity cost 
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of doing their taxes. This model generates a 
wide distribution of filing times for returns 
which will get refunds and rationalizes pro- 
crastination. However, our framework fails to 
generate early filing of returns with taxes due, 
and we consider the issue again after our anal- 
ysis of the data. 
In section V, we take the predictions of our 
model to the data. We examine the various 
characteristics of refund and remittance re- 
turns and perform some reduced-form regres- 
sions of the determinants of return filing time. 
Most supportive of our interpretation of late 
filing for refunds, there is much less procras- 
tination for returns which are filled out by a 
paid preparer, than for returns which are filed 
by the taxpayer. Further, we find that the com- 
plexity of forms delays filing, both for returns 
with tax due and for those with refunds. Peo- 
ple with a higher marginal valuation of time, 
proxied by higher incomes, are more likely to 
file later, and the larger the refund value, the 
sooner the return is expected to be filed. Re- 
turns which are completed by professional tax 
preparers do not exhibit these last two char- 
acteristics. Finally, cross-year analysis dem- 
onstrates that filing late is habitual, suggest- 
ing that households have persistently different 
values of time or propensities to procrastinate. 
We conclude by speculating on the objectives 
and constraints which might generate early 
filing by individuals with taxes due and by 
considering the implications of our findings. 
We believe that our investigation of the 
timing of tax return filing informs us about 
other examples of apparently non-optimal 
timing of economic behavior. Since people 
postpone the work of filling out tax forms de- 
spite real monetary costs, they may well post- 
pone seeking a raise, comparison shopping, or 
switching supermarkets in response to price 
changes. Such behavior would generate 
“sticky behavior” leading to real rather than 
price adjustments in markets. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Individual tax returns for tax year 1988 
were due on Monday, April 17, 1989.2 For 
those who owed tax, the penalty for late pay- 
2. The deadline is April 15, unless that date falls on a 
weekend, in which case it is extended to the following 
Monday. 
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rate for the previous quarter. 
rnent was one-half a percent of the amount 
unpaid per month, not to exceed 25%. Further, 
interest, at roughly 11% per annum, was 
charged on the late taxes and on any penalty 
as it accrued? For a return with taxes due that 
wasfiled late, there was an additional penalty 
of 5% of the amount due for each month (or 
fraction) the return was late, not to exceed 
25%. For a return over 60 days late, a mini- 
mum penalty-the smaller of $100 or the 
amount of taxes due-became applicable. By 
filling out a simple form, the due date for the 
forms could be extended to August 15, but all 
taxes were still due on April 17. There was no 
penalty for filing for refunds late, but the 
forms must be filed within three years of the 
due date in order to claim the refund. 
In order to avoid a penalty, estimated tax 
payments plus withholding had to equal the 
minimum of 90% of the current year’s tax li- 
ability and 100% of the previous year’s tax 
liability. The penalty for underpayment or late 
payment of estimated tax was calculated for 
three separate periods. For the first period 
(4115i88 to 9/30/88), the penalty was 10% of 
the difference between the tax liability and the 
taxes paid, times the number of days in period 
1, divided by 360. For periods two and three, 
(10/1/88 to 12/31/88 and 1/1/89 to 4/15/89, 
respectively) the rate was 11 % per annum. If 
there was an underpayment in period one and 
a full payment in period two, a portion of the 
period-two payment was applied to the pe- 
riod-one payment and an underpayment was 
charged for period two. 
Individuals choose how much to have with- 
held from their paychecks by filling out W-4 
forms; these forms provide instructions for 
taxpayers on how they should be filled out. 
The only legal requirements and penalties as- 
sociated with withholding are those associated 
with late or underpayment of taxes, as out- 
lined above. 
111. THE DATA AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
FILING TIMES 
The Data 
To evaluate the predictions of our subse- 
quent model and to try to shed some light on 
why individuals pass up over $1 billion in in- 
3.  The interest rate was keyed to the short-term Federal 
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FIGURE 1 
Number of Returns by Month Filed 
All 1988 Returns 










terest income by filing their tax forms when 
they do, we use the 1988 Internal Revenue 
Service Individual Model File. This data set 
is a stratified random sample of approxi- 
mately 95,000 individual income tax returns 
filed during 1989 for tax year 1988 by U.S. 
citizens and residents. Each record has infor- 
mation on roughly 200 line items from the 
1040 tax form and its supplementary sched- 
ules. To each record we have appended the 
date assigned by the IRS Service Center upon 
receipt of the return. 
Filing Dates 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of returns 
by month of receipt, with April split into 
halves, April 1 through 14 being denoted Ap 1, 
and April 15 through 30 denoted Ap2. While 
40% of all returns processed during the year 
are processed in April, it is clearly not the case 
that all returns with taxes due are filed at the 
last minute, nor is it true that all returns with 
refunds are filed well before the deadline. We 
also observe that the distribution of returns 
with refunds rises earlier than the distribution 
of returns with tax due, which is in accord 
with the economic incentives of the situation. 
Some 63% of tax returns with refunds are pro- 
cessed from January to March, while 19% of 
returns with taxes due are processed over the 
same period. When we looked only at returns 
with refunds or taxes due greater than $500,4 
this difference was slightly more pronounced. 
Conversely, of returns with refunds less than 
$500, 60% are processed from January to 
March, while of returns with taxes owed of 
less than $500, 24% are processed then. Thus, 
whether the return has taxes owed or a refund 
seems to affect when it is filed. There also 
seems to be a size effect-people with larger 
refunds are likely to file earlier, while those 
with large amounts of tax due are likely to file 
nearer the deadline, although the shape of the 
distributions does not visibly change much 
when segregated by size of refundremittance. 
4. All dollar figures are reported in current, that is 
1989, dollars. 
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We can also infer behavior from the distri- 
bution of returns filed after April 15. There is 
a rise in the number of returns processed in 
August, reflecting an “echo” effect similar to 
what we find in mid-April, for those people 
who file for automatic extensions and who 
face a second deadline of August 15. There is 
also an increase in the number of returns filed 
from the first to the second half of April. This 
reflects the April 17 deadline and possibly re- 
flects IRS delays in assigning a date of receipt 
to returns received during the last-minute 
surge of filings in April. 
There is one important caveat to our con- 
clusions about the relationship between re- 
fund status and filing time, which one must 
also consider when interpreting our regression 
results in section V taxpayers have significant 
control over whether they owe taxes or have 
taxes due. By changing their withholding dur- 
ing the previous calendar year or by making 
additional estimated tax payments, people can 
to a significant degree control the amount 
which they will receive as a refund or which 
they will owe. Why the great majority of tax- 
payers allow themselves to get into refund sta- 
tus, granting the government an interest-fiee 
loan during the tax year, is itself a fascinating 
question. For our purposes it implies that in- 
dividuals may self-select into the categories 
which we interpret as explanatory variables. 
Because for some change in an exogenous 
variable (i.e., the elimination of a schedule), 
some individuals might switch refund catego- 
ries, our estimates are not the deep structural 
parameters which determine the aggregate 
distribution of filing dates. 
Ideally, we would correct for this bias by 
estimating a model which jointly determines 
the refund status and filing time, conditional 
on refund status. However, this requires either 
making strong assumptions about functional 
form or finding a variable which affects the 
decision as to which refund status to select 
into, but not the decision as to when to file. 
In light of the lack of a clear theory, we do 
not feel comfortable making either assump- 
tion. We refer the reader to two interesting 
preliminary empirical analyses of the with- 
holding decision in Cordes et al. [1988a; 
1988b1. Furthermore, in the regression analy- 
ses discussed below, those with a refund due 
are analyzed separately from those with tax 
due. 
IV. CONCEPTUAL MODELS 
In this section we sketch some simple mod- 
els of when people fill out and mail in their 
tax returns, in the hope of matching the raw 
facts presented in the previous section. Our 
objective is to draw implications from these 
models which we can use to guide the ernpir- 
ical explorations that follow. 
In the simplest model without uncertainty, 
consider a taxpayer who will receive a refund, 
i.e., taxes withheld plus estimated taxes paid 
exceed actual tax liability. Because it grants the 
government an interest-free loan, delaying fil- 
ing costs the taxpayer foregone interest. Com- 
pared to filing at the last possible time T, the 
gain from filing before the deadline can be ap- 
proximated by iR( T- t), where i is the nominal 
interest rate, R is the refund amount, and t is 
the time of filing. If, alternatively, tax is due 
(R < 0), it is optimal to file as late as possible; 
filing prematurely costs the taxpayer iR(t - B), 
where B is the earliest possible filing date. 
As Figure 1 makes clear however, the sim- 
ple prediction of this model-a bimodal dis- 
tribution of return filing dates at 0 and T-is 
not consistent with actual behavior. Instead, 
we observe a temporal distribution for returns 
which, while peaking at the deadline, is 
spread out between the earliest filing date and 
the deadline. We now examine some possible 
explanations for this pattern. 
If, before investing time and money in the 
process, the taxpayer is uncertain about the sign 
and size of his balance due, it will generally be 
optimal to complete the tax forms as soon as 
possible, but in some cases postpone when the 
return is filed.5 However, once the return is 
completed and it is known whether a refund is 
forthcoming, the decision as to when to file is 
trivial, and reduces to the problem above: file 
immediately if R > 0, and wait until T if R < 0. 
Considering uncertainty over the sign of the 
refund merely moves the puzzle from why peo- 
ple file when they do, to why they choose to 
acquire information when they do. 
To us, a most plausible way to generate 
other than a bimodal distribution of filing 
5. In fact many taxpayers do not need to complete the 
tax return in order to know whether a refund is forthcom- 
ing. Previous years provide an extremely good predictor, 
and quick calculations can often reveal into which camp a 
household will fatl. Finally, as we pointed out in the pre- 
vious section, returns with a large amount of taxes due still 
exhibit procrastination and substantial heterogeneity in fil- 
ing times. 
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times is to allow the opportunity cost of com- 
pleting a tax return to be a random variable, 
uncorrelated across time, but with substantial 
variation possible across individuals in mean 
and standard deviation. The idea is that each 
day taxpayers receive a random draw for their 
valuation of time that day, and decide whether 
to commit the time to do their taxes then or 
to postpone the task, hoping for a lower draw 
in the future. People do not know what future 
draws will be, nor can they use any draws 
prior to the current one, but they are aware of 
the distribution of their draws. This decision 
model does not allow for path dependence of 
utility and is perfectly rational and dynami- 
cally consistent. 
Intuitively, this model corresponds to tax- 
payers making daily decisions about what to 
do with their leisure time, knowing that taxes 
have to be done by time T to avoid a penalty. 
Each day taxpayers consider other leisure op- 
tions, and their current mood. We view these 
random values of leisure time as resulting 
from a combination of tastes and external op- 
tions for leisure time activities. One is un- 
likely to fill out tax forms on an evening one 
has been invited out with friends, or on an 
evening when one is feeling particularly lazy 
and unfocused. 
This model leads to a non-degenerate dis- 
tribution of tax return completion times, and 
parallels job-search models in the labor liter- 
ature. The solution is characterized by a res- 
ervation level of opportunity cost, call it zt, 
such that the taxpayer who reaches time t with 
the tax forms uncompleted will choose to 
complete the forms if the draw of opportunity 
cost that day is lower than zl; otherwise the 
taxpayer will postpone doing taxes for another 
day as in McCall [1970] and Lippman and 
McCall [ 19761. If, upon completion of the tax 
return, the taxpayer is owed a refund, the re- 
turn should be filed immediately; if tax is due, 
the return should not be remitted until the fil- 
ing deadline. 
The predictions of this model fit the rele- 
vant aspects of observed behavior. First, peo- 
ple do postpone filling out their tax forms, 
even when they can reasonably expect a re- 
fund, sometimes waiting until just before the 
deadline. When the deadline is approached 
they often will be filling out their forms in a 
high disutility-of-time period, having passed 
up lower disutility periods, thinking they 
would get lower draws still. If people receive 
high enough draws as they near the deadline, 
it may be optimal for them to take the penalty 
and file late, allowing them to fill out their 
forms at a more convenient time; filing late 
can be optimal behavior. Thus, this model 
generates a non-degenerate distribution for 
filing of returns with refunds due. 
Further predictions of this model, which 
follow directly from the solution of the anal- 
ogous model presented in Mortensen [1977] 
and extended in Engberg [ 199 I], are as fol- 
lows. An earlier expected time of filing is as- 
sociated with a higher reservation level of op- 
portunity cost relative to the expected value 
of opportunity cost, which would be caused 
by a higher refund, lower costs of filing, 
higher interest rates, or a lower subjective dis- 
count rate. Thus, our model predicts that peo- 
ple with lower valuations of time, which in 
section V we will represent by lower incomes 
and age exemptions, should file earlier, for a 
given value of refund. Secondly, on average 
those people with larger refunds should file 
earlier than those with smaller refunds, who 
should file sooner than those people with 
taxes due, ceteris paribus. We expect com- 
plexity of the return to increase the time in- 
volved in completing the forms, thus causing 
people to file later. Note that in the simple 
model discussed above an increase in filing 
cost affected only people on the margin be- 
tween filing at the earliest possible time or at 
the last minute; by contrast, in this model 
complexity decreases everyone’s probabilities 
of tiling in early periods. People with higher 
effective discount rates should postpone fill- 
ing out their tax forms longer. 
Before leaving the discussion of the con- 
ceptual model, one point deserves further em- 
phasis. The model outlined here can explain 
a distribution of filing times for returns filed 
with refunds. However, neither this model nor 
any model with rational behavior can easily 
explain why returns with tax balance due are 
filed before the deadline. It may be that some 
taxpayers are facing the penalty for underpay- 
ment which, as described in section 11, de- 
pends in part on the filing date.6 It also may 
6. We are grateful to Margaret Reed for alerting us to 
this possibility. 
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be that early filers with a balance due are con- 
cerned that the return will be misplaced if not 
mailed immediately, are concerned that funds 
will not be available at a later date, or are 
extremely averse to being in debt. We delay 
further speculation on these points until after 
our regression analysis. 
In his 1991 address to the American Eco- 
nomics Association, George Akerlof empha- 
sized the potential importance of procrastina- 
tion for economic behavior and set out a sim- 
ple model of the phenomenon. It is interesting 
to contrast his model of procrastination with 
the model outlined above. In Akerlof‘s model 
there is a high relative (negative) weight 
placed on work today relative to work tomor- 
row- the  agent is endowed with a high one- 
period discount rate. Thus people have a 
strong preference to postpone tasks until the 
next day. As the days pass this can lead to 
lengthy procrastination resulting from a series 
of small decisions. Akerlof‘s model implies 
that if it is optimal to postpone completing 
one’s tax forms for one day at t = 0, it is 
optimal to postpone, day by day, until T - 1. 
If it is still optimal to postpone at T - 1 , then 
it is optimal never to tile one’s taxes (barring 
criminal penalties, etc.). 
The critical difference in the two models is 
their dynamic consistency. The model pre- 
sented here is dynamically consistent, while 
the Akerlof model is dynamically inconsis- 
tent-a fully rational agent could see that any 
decision to postpone by just one day would 
lead to further procrastination and would not 
plan to postpone by just one day.’ Second, our 
model rationalizes the observed distribution 
of tax filing times. If individuals were inter- 
viewed at the end of January and asked to 
assign probabilities as to when they would fill 
out and file their taxes, these answers would 
differ significantly depending on which is the 
correct model. The model outlined in this 
paper predicts that people understand that 
they are likely to postpone doing their taxes, 
and could give reasonable approximations to 
the true probabilities of their postponing their 
taxes until the week before April 15th. People 
whose behavior is governed by the Akerlof 
7. The optimal dynamically consistent strategies to 
similar problems have since been analyzed in Laibson 
[1994]. 
model would respond that they plan to do their 
taxes in the next week, while they would ac- 
tually often postpone this task until the filing 
deadline is near. 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Characteristics of Early and Late Filers 
Table I presents information about the av- 
erage tax return characteristics of taxpayers 
that filed during three different periods of 
1989, classified by whether the returns had 
refunds or tax due. We name these taxpayers 
“early filers” if their forms were processed 
from January to March, “procrastinators” if 
their returns were processed in April, and 
“late filers” if their returns were processed 
after May 1. The table displays the means of 
several tax return items and also the percent 
of the forms filed with certain characteristics. 
Several patterns are visible in Table I. 
Among those returns with a balance due, peo- 
ple who file earlier on average have lower 
amounts of tax due. The parallel prediction 
that early filers have larger refunds is not sup- 
ported by this table. Second, as we hypothe- 
sized, complexity is apparently associated 
with late filing. The percentage of returns with 
interest and dividend income, supplemental 
income, farm income, capital gains income, 
itemizing, Keogh, self-employment income, 
estimated tax payments, married status, and 
using Form 1040 (rather than the simpler 
Form 1040A or Form 1040EZ) all increase as 
one moves from early to late filers. The per- 
centage of returns which are 1040A and 
1040EZ declines through time. Although not 
part of our set of hypotheses, we find that 40% 
of those early filers with taxes due are elderly 
while only 11 % of tax returns are filed by the 
elderly. Most of these trends occur for all re- 
turns, for returns with refunds, and for returns 
with tax due. 
The average income rises across the three 
periods, which may be an indication of the 
correlation between income and complexity, 
andor that higher income individuals have a 
higher cost of time and are more likely to 
postpone filling out their forms. Note that for 
returns with taxes due, adjusted gross income 
is much higher for those who file in April, 
while for returns with refunds it increases 
concomitantly for late filers. This fits our the- 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































702 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 
penalty associated with late filing; therefore, 
of people who have not filed early and receive 
low draws of opportunity cost near the dead- 
line, those with refunds are more likely to pro- 
crastinate further. Further, some of the remit- 
tance returns processed in early April may 
have been completed in a low opportunity cost 
period early on, and then held to be mailed in 
at the deadline. 
Table I1 reveals that these patterns also ap- 
pear when the preparation status of the return 
is held constant. It also shows clearly that re- 
turns prepared by a professional are on aver- 
age more complex and the filers have higher 
income. 
Regression Analysis 
Drawing conclusions based on these pat- 
terns is problematic because there are signif- 
icant correlations among many of the catego- 
ries on the left-hand side of the table. How- 
ever, we can examine the partial associations 
of filing behavior with return characteristics 
through multiple regression analysis. The 
structure which our theory imposes on the 
data suggests we estimate a structural search 
model. However, we chose not to employ this 
procedure because of its difficulty in estima- 
tion and, in particular, the sensitivity of such 
models to errors-in-variables and omitted- 
variables bias. Wolpin [ 19871 and Engberg 
[I9911 both demonstrate and comment on the 
complexity and sensitivity of this method. 
As an alternative, we employ a Tobit re- 
gression. We eliminate from the sample all 
returns processed after April 30, in order to 
examine primarily those taxpayers who did 
not file late.* All our conclusions hold for this 
sample only, and do not take into account the 
phenomenon of late filers becoming procras- 
tinators. However, our results do not change 
much if we set this cutoff date to, for example, 
December 31 or to April 22. We treat all re- 
turns processed on April 17th or later as if we 
did not know the true desired date of filing, 
but observed only that this date was con- 
strained by the deadline.9 The Tobit regression 
8. The filing deadline was April 17. However, there is 
a variable tag between when the return was marked and 
when it is processed by the IRS. 
9. Our results also did not change much when we re- 
placed April I 7  with April 10. 
is weighted by the population weight of the 
individual. lo 
Table I11 presents the results of these re- 
gressions, both with and without a dummy 
variable for paid preparer status. With the ex- 
ception of adjusted gross income and the pres- 
ence of an Individual Retirement Account or 
Keogh plan, all the variables in Table 111 have 
estimated coefficients which are significantly 
different from zero at the 0.1% level.ll 
According to the results presented in Table 
111, filing later is associated with larger esti- 
mated payments and a larger balance due, and 
with using supplemental schedules (with the 
exception of Schedule F). The association 
with balance due provides some evidence of 
economic rationality and is consistent with 
model predictions. The magnitude of the co- 
efficient is, however, small, suggesting that it 
takes an extra $4525 refund to speed up the 
filing of the return by one day. The positive 
coefficients on the supplemental schedules, 
which are interpreted as a dimension of com- 
plexity, are also consistent with model predic- 
tions. Filing earlier is associated with filing 
jointly, being 65 or older (also consistent with 
model predictions), and using either the Form 
1040A or Form 1040EZ “short forms.” 
We refrain from drawing inferences from 
the coefficient on preparation mode (self-pre- 
pared or contracted out) because of taxpayer 
self-selection of  this choice variable. The 
functional relationship between filing date 
and preparation mode may be further compli- 
cated by the potential endogeneity of prepa- 
ration mode. It is possible that procrastinators 
resort to a paid preparer at the last minute in 
an attempt to file a timely return. In order to 
investigate the importance of these effects, we 
also offer reduced-form estimates of the 
model, excluding the preparer variable, in 
10. Population weights are calculated by the IRS by 
dividing the population count of returns in a sample stra- 
tum by the number o f  sample returns for that stratum. 
Strata are primarily income-based. 
1 1 .  At the suggestion of a referee, we checked the va- 
lidity of some of the structure imposed by the Tobit as- 
sumption. For the all-returns regression, we ran both a 
probit, in which the dependent variable denoted whether a 
return was censored, and an ordinary least squares regres- 
sion on the non-censored population. The probit coeffi- 
cients generally replicated the Tobit coefficients in sign 
and relative magnitudes, with the exception of Paid Pre- 
parer, which became small and positive. In the OLS re- 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































~ ~~ ~~ 
Calendar Year 1988 Returns Filing During January-April 1989 
Dependent VariableFiling Date (Censored at 4/17/89), January 1 = 1, etc. 
wlPREP Standard  Er ro r  wlo P R E P  Standard  Error 
~ 
Intercept 83.3*** 0.36 84.2*** 0.30 
Agi 0.0282 0.50 0.0251 0.050 
Estpay 0.141*** 0.034 0.144*** 0.034 
Baldue 0.22 I*** 0.025 0.223*** 0.025 
M& -3.60*** 0.3 1 -3.62*** 0.3 1 
Age -2,72*** 0.43 -2.70*** 0.43 
Scha 3.24*** 0.37 3.187*** 0.37 
Schb 5.96*** 0.68 6.04*** 0.68 
Schc 12.1*** 0.6 1 12.2*** 0.61 
Schd 7.46*** 0.56 7.5 I*** 0.56 
Sche 10.9*** 0.45 11.1 *** 0.45 
Schf -7.58*** 0.97 -7.35*** 0.96 
Schse 9.73*** 0.67 9.85*** 0.67 
IRA 0.383 0.56 0.307 0.56 
Keo 0.222 1.91 0.150 1.91 
F1040A -12.6*** 0.4 1 -13.1 *** 0.39 
FI040EZ -15.0*** 0.45 -15.8*** 0.4 1 
Prep 1.39*** 0.30 
n (unweighted) 64,794 64,794 
Censored 23,866 23,866 
36.3% 36.3% 
Log Likelihood -269,865 -269,875 
*** p < .001 
**p<.o1 
* p < . 0 5  


















Adjusted gross income ($0000) 
Estimated tax payments ($000) 
Balance due (refund) upon filing ($000) 
Marital status indicator (O/l-Other/Married Filing Jointly) 
Aged indicator, primary or secondary taxpayer (Oll-AbsentPresent) 
Schedule A (Itemized Deductions) indicator (Oh-AbsentlPresent) 
Schedule B (Interest & Dividends) indicator (Oil-AbsentlPresent) 
Schedule C (Business ProfiVLoss) indicator (O/l-Absentpresent) 
Schedule D (Capital Gainskosses) indicator (0/ I-AbsenVPresent) 
Schedule E (Supplemental IncomelLoss) indicator (Oll-Absentpresent) 
Schedule F (Farm Income/Loss) indicator (0/ I-Absent/Present) 
Schedule SE (Self - Employment Tax) indicator (O/l-AbsenVPresent) 
Individual Retirement Account indicator (Oll-AbsentiPresent) 
Keogh (H.R. 10) Retirement Plan Account indicator (Oll-Absent/Present) 
Form 1040A indicator (0/ I-AbsenVPresent) 
Form 1040EZ indicator (O/l-AbsentPresent) 
Preparation mode indicator (Oll-Self-Prepared/Paid-Prepared) 




Calendar Year 1988 Returns Filing during January-April 1989 
Dependent Variable-Filing Date (Censored at 4/17/89) 
Self-prep Standard Error Paid-Prep Standard Error 
Intercept 85.5*** 0.66 84.1*** 0.30 
Agi -0.24 1 0.15 0.160*** 0.044 
Estpay 0.488*** 0.12 0.0757** 0.029 
Baldue 3.57*** 0. I4 0.0797*** 0.02 1 
M8 -2.66*** 0.59 -4.07*** 0.32 
Age -5.34*** 0.91 -1.91 *** 0.42 
Scha 3.88*** 0.80 3.44 * * * 0.35 
Schb 4.21** 1.67 6.48*** 0.61 
Schc 14.3*** 1.47 11.3*** 0.55 
Schd 7.69*** I .35 6.52*** 0.51 
Sche 11.2*** 1.13 10.5*** 0.41 
Schf -5.19 3.13 -7.53*** 0.82 
Schse 6.52*** 1.76 9.57*** 0.60 
IR4  1.43 1.07 -0.179 0.58 
Keo -5.51 4.74 1.56 1.73 
F1040A -11.9*** 0.69 -13.1*** 0.54 
F1040EZ -16.0*** 0.72 -9.23 *** 1.08 
n (unweighted) 24,861 40,933 
Censored 5,969 17,897 
24.0% 43.7% 
Log Likelihood -105,027 -160,781 
*** p < .001 
**p< .o1  
* p < .05 
Variable definitions: See Table 111. 
Table 111. The coefficient estimates are virtu- 
ally identical to those of the model with the 
preparer variable included, suggesting that the 
potential confounding effects of preparer 
choice are not large. 
Table IV reports the results of estimating 
the basic equation separately for taxpayers 
who prepared their own return and for taxpay- 
ers who used a professional preparer. One 
striking difference emerges. Self-preparers 
are about 45 times more sensitive to the re- 
fund or balance due amount compared to tax- 
payers using professional preparers. A differ- 
ence of only $280 (1000 divided by 3.57) is 
enough to induce a self-preparer to file a day 
earlier; much more than that is required for 
professionally prepared returns. Note in some 
cases the taxpayer may not have complete 
control over when the return is filed when a 
tax professional is involved. 
Partitioning the sample by tax balance (i.e., 
refund or tax due) controls for one of the most 
important determinants of filing date. Table V 
shows that, when this is done, gross income 
is positively associated with later filing in 
both groups. A larger refund accelerates filing, 
but a larger tax due has only a very small 
effect on postponing balance due returns. The 
filing acceleration effect of being elderly is 
seen to be much larger for tax due returns; the 
reverse is true for the acceleration effect of 
filing a 1040A or 1040EZ return. We also see 
that earlier filing by farmers appears to be 
only for those that have a balance due. Inex- 




Calendar Year 1988 Returns Filing during fanuary-April 1989 
Dependent Variable-Filing Date (Censored at 4/17/89) 




















Log Likelihood -1 
78.4*** 
0.150* 










































































*** p < .001 
** p < .01 
' p i . 0 5  
Variable definitions: See Table 111. 
plicably, for returns claiming refunds, farming 
is associated with later filing. The relationship 
between filing date and tax-favored savings 
plans also appears to depend on tax balance- 
a positive association is detected only for 
IRAs and only for refund returns, while a neg- 
ative association exists for both IRAs and 
Keoghs for returns with tax due. Most of these 
relationships continue to hold across tax bal- 
ance after controlling for preparation mode, 
as shown in Table VI. 
It is important to reiterate that, because 
both the use of a paid preparer and refund 
status are subject to taxpayer choice, these es- 
timates are best viewed as descriptive rather 
than structural in nature. As an example, the 
presence of a complex tax status is likely to 
increase the likelihood of using a paid tax pre- 
parer, as well as filing date conditional on pre- 
parer status. 
Longitudinal Analysis 
To examine the persistence of procrastina- 
tion over time, we analyzed returns from the 
1979-1988 Statistics of Income Panel of In- 
dividual Returns, which is a part of the Ernst 
& YoungKJniversity of Michigan Tax Re- 
search Database. The Panel Files are subsets 
of the Individual Model Files that represent a 
simple random sample of individual income 
tax returns filed each calendar year. More im- 
portantly, although identifiers have been de- 
leted and extensive safeguards have been 
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record contains a code based on the Taxpayer 
Identification Number that allows tracking the 
same taxpayers over time. The date is not 
available in the Panel, so we use the week the 
return was posted to the IRS Individual Mas- 
ter File (the posting “cycle”) as a proxy for 
filing date. In the panel, our proxy for filing 
date is posting cycle, which ranges from 4 to 
52. Both the median and mode posting cycle 
is 19 (the week of May 7th) in 1989, some- 
what later than the filing date. That reflects 
the processing time at the Service Center, 
which varies by tax balance (refundhalance 
due). Although a less precise estimate of filing 
time, it is highly correlated with the calendar 
date that was used in the cross-sectional anal- 
ysis. In the 1988 Model file, the Pearson cor- 
relation between the two is 0.911 (p < .OOOl). 
Using current year returns from the Panel, 
we calculated the Pearson correlation of the 
posting cycle week from year to year for each 
return ID appearing in consecutive years. The 
posting cycle field is not available for 1979, 
so our analysis is for tax years 1980-1988 (re- 
turns filed during 198 1-1989). The variation 
in sample size reflects varying sampling rates 
in the panel. Time of filing from year to year 
is positively correlated at 0.539 and (p < .0001 
for all years), which indicates persistent be- 
havior. Thus we conclude that many of the 
factors which we argue affect expected filing 
time, such as a household’s discount rate and 
value of time, are, as one might expect, per- 
sistent. 
Future extensions of our exploration of the 
temporal persistence of taxpayer filing behav- 
ior may help to explain some of the puzzling 
aspects of behavior we uncovered in the cross- 
sectional analysis. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents the first empirical anal- 
ysis of individual taxpayers’ filing time. We 
find some evidence that is consistent with our 
model of the optimal filing date. Ceteris pari- 
bus, higher refunds are associated with earlier 
filing, complex returns are associated with 
Iater fiIing, and higher incomes (as a proxy 
for higher costs of time) are associated with 
later filing. 
Our model cannot adequately capture the 
less comprehensible fact that millions of filers 
remit their taxes due before the filing dead- 
line. These taxpayers, as a group, passed up 
$46 million in interest income in 1989. We do 
find, however, that this behavior is concen- 
trated among the elderly, a group which on 
average has a lower value of time. It is pos- 
sible that those who file early are averse to 
being in debt, fear forgetting or losing their 
return materials, or perhaps get utility from 
fulfilling their half of their contract with the 
government. l2  
Although our simple model leaves much of 
the variation in filing times unexplained, we 
believe that our results suggest that something 
akin to our theoretical model may be a good 
approximation to actual behavior. In our 
model people do not leave $100 bills lying 
around on the sidewalk forever. However, 
they may leave them there for some time 
while they wait for a moment when bending 
over to get the bill is relatively painless. Thus, 
we suggest that human behavior sometimes 
allows short-run profit opportunities to pass. 
They pass not due to individual irrationality 
or near-rationality, but rather because of the 
stochastic nature of individuals’ opportunity 
costs of acting. As we document in our case 
of tax filing, in aggregate the amount of these 
foregone profits can be large: nearly a billion 
dollars in interest was foregone by the group 
of taxpayers who were due refunds and chose 
to file at the deadline in 1989. 
A more sophisticated analysis would allow 
for the tax filing time to be jointly determined 
with choice of preparer status and refund sta- 
tus. The latter connection is particularly intri- 
guing because it involves (as does the filing 
time decision) foregoing interest by remitting 
taxes earlier than necessary. We leave to fu- 
ture research the task of an integrated analysis 
of tax withholding (and estimated tax pay- 
ments) and filing time. 
12. The elderly, for example, receive far more in ben- 
efits from the Federal government than they currently pay 
for (and lifetime resources received also far outweigh life- 
time payments). 
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